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Falsiﬁability is the cornerstone of science. However, Rutherford notwithstanding, almost
by deﬁnition science functions at the limits of measurement accuracy and theoretical
grasp, so that statistical analysis is central to scientiﬁc advance. This applies as much to
physics as it does to psychology, as much to geology as to biology. I look at some of the
potholes in the path of scientiﬁc discovery, showing how easy it is to stumble, and at
some of the consequences for the scientiﬁc endeavour.
1. The Causes of Unreason
The late Stuart Sutherland began Chapter 22 of his book Irrationality by saying that:
‘At a rough count, about a hundred different systematic causes for irrational thinking
have been described.’1 In his book Why People Believe Weird Things, Michael Shermer
enumerates 25 of these.2 But it seems to me that there are a few high-level categories
of sources of unreason. The dividing lines between these categories are not sharp – they
intersect and overlap to some extent – but nevertheless, as is so often the case in human
discourse, a taxonomy can be useful. My categories are ideology, ignorance, gullibility,
biology, behavioural economics, misunderstandings of science, and chance.
1.1. Ideology
Ideology will usually have been imbibed when young (recall the Jesuits’ proud boast) but
in some cases will have resulted from a conversion. Clearly, education is at the root
of tackling this. But education cannot dispel the problem entirely. Our politicians are
(mostly) educated, but they sometimes give the impression of working on the basis of
ideology-based policy, rather than evidence-based policy.
1.2. Ignorance
Ignorance, in some sense, underlies it all. One would like to think that, as knowledge
advances, so unreason arising from ignorance retreats. But perhaps that would be hoping
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for too much: one cannot be knowledgeable about everything and despite the Royal
Society’s motto (nullius in verba: take nobody’s word for it), sometimes one just has to
take somebody’s word for it.
1.3. Gullibility
There is a long history of people relaxing their critical faculties, from nineteenth century
mediums, through a belief that Uri Geller could actually perform magic, to pseudo-religious
cults. A combination of ignorance and gullibility provides a particularly powerful force.
Instructive examples are Alan Sokal’s meaningless spoof article ‘Transgressing the
boundaries: toward a transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity’,3 which was
accepted and published in the journal Social Text, and the study described by Peters and
Ceci,4 in which 12 papers by eminent authors that had already been published in psy-
chology journals were rekeyed and resubmitted to the same journals, using ﬁctitious authors
from imaginary non-prestigious organisations, and which were then almost all rejected by
the journals (nine of the 12 were not recognised as having been published before, and eight
of these were rejected, although none on the grounds that it added nothing new).
1.4. Biology
Here I have in mind irrationality induced by psychotropic drugs or brain-damage. One is
most familiar with this in the context of psychiatric illness, but studies have shown that
this can be more pointed. If an epileptic focus develops in a particular part of the brain, it
can induce religious experiences. And now we also have discussions of a ‘God gene’,
which predisposes people to have mystic experiences.
1.5. Behavioural Economics
Researchers such as Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have challenged the rational
man of classical economics by drawing attention to numerous ways in which people
behave irrationally. Kahneman and Tversky’s research makes entertaining, if somewhat
unsettling, reading since it describes behavioural characteristics from which it is very
difﬁcult to escape. Many of their examples fall into the category of misunderstandings of
chance and probability, which I will discuss later. But non-probabilistic examples include
the immediacy effect, in which one’s most recent exposures inﬂuence attitudes and
decisions, the halo effect, in which one has a tendency to generalise about someone on
the basis of little information, and availability errors, in which one’s understanding is
distorted by how easy it is to bring something to mind.
1.6. Misunderstandings of Science
My sixth category is how science is misunderstood by the lay public. This misunderstanding
itself occurs in several ways.
The ﬁrst, and perhaps most fundamental, is the failure to recognise that science is a
process, not a product. It describes a strategy for critically evaluating evidence, rather
than taking it on trust. Science is all too often taught as the end product itself.
Falsiﬁability is the cornerstone of science, and it is this notion that needs to be taught,
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alongside the need for painstaking accumulation of evidence (although the conclusions
themselves do also need to be taught).
A superﬁcial illustration of how people fail to grasp that science is a process rather
than a product is implicit in the idea that an experiment can ‘fail’. Of course, an
experiment can fail because the equipment breaks, or was not powerful enough to
achieve its ends, and so on – but if the Large Hadron Collider ‘fails’ to detect the Higgs
Boson it is not because the experiment itself has failed.
If evidence lies at the root of science, it is important to recognise that evidence
accumulates, and science builds on that accumulated evidence. When a theory is found to
be wanting, its replacement must explain both the new evidence, which casts doubt on
the old theory, and the old evidence, which was consistent with the old theory.
One of the difﬁculties with which science has to contend is that, by deﬁnition, it functions
at the frontier of knowledge. Very often, that means that it is working on the edge of
detectability: it is surely a rare experiment in which a clear-cut result is found immediately.
And this must be historically true as well, as scientiﬁc theory and measurement technology
continue their leapfrogging of progress. In fact, I have formulated a sort of scientiﬁc version
of the economists’ efﬁcient market hypothesis. However, given that the efﬁcient market
hypothesis has now been comprehensively discredited on various grounds, my efﬁcient
science hypothesis has a precautionary qualiﬁer, which says: ‘if it was easy, it would almost
certainly already be known’.
I mentioned Lord Rutherford in my abstract. This was a reference to his comment ‘if
your experiment needs statistics, you ought to have done a better experiment’. I’m afraid,
noting my comment about science being at the frontier of knowledge, I would respond
by saying that ‘if your experiment does not need statistics, then you have not been
imaginative enough’. Of course, you will no doubt think it is exceedingly bold of me to
question the wisdom and imagination of a scientiﬁc giant such as Lord Rutherford. But
I take heart in the fact that he is also alleged to have said ‘anyone who expects a source of
power from the transformation of the atom is talking moonshine’.
I am sure that this location of science at the frontier between knowledge and
ignorance accounts for much of the public misunderstanding of science, because it
inevitably means that scientiﬁc results have a tendency to be positive and negative
with equal probability. Far from the frontier, I can conduct an experiment and be
conﬁdent that I can predict which way the outcome will go. At the frontier, the prob-
ability has to be almost a half. And this is one reason why we ﬁnd reports one day
saying that coffee is good for us, the next day it is bad; that one day we read we need
an hour’s vigorous exercise a day to keep healthy, and the next that ten minutes will do.
And so on.
Furthermore, as science progresses, so it takes account of more subtle phenomena.
The discovery that excess dietary fat was bad for us had to be modiﬁed in the light of the
later recognition that there are different kinds of fat. Naturally this leads to scientiﬁc
assertions changing as time passes: science accretes understanding gradually, and as
evidence accumulates so people change their mind. Remember John Maynard Keynes,
on being accused of inconsistency: ‘when the facts change, I change my mind’ (and his
corollary question: ‘what do you do?’).
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I will conclude my discussion of the public misunderstanding of science by telling you
about an unexpected experience I had at the Dana Centre. The Dana Centre is a branch of
the Science Museum, concerned with communicating science to the public. I had been
asked to chair a discussion, in which I said just a few words of introduction and then invited
questions from a lay audience of about 60 people. I summarised how science worked – and
in particular the role of statistics in evaluating the match between theory and reality, the
latter in the form of data collected from experiments. But I was taken aback when a woman
in the audience asked why scientists should ever be trusted. After all, she said, scientists had
to be funded by someone, and why would anyone ever pay unless they had a vested interest.
I mumbled something about the disinterested nature of the research councils, but was
uncomfortably aware of the historical record of commercial bodies funding research to
reinforce a given position. My point is that this suspicion is justiﬁed. I was going to add that
we need to overcome it, but that is not right. We need to encourage people like the
questioner in their healthy scepticism, but not to the extent that they assume everyone is
lying. Again, nullius in verba is all very well, but one must not take it too far.
2. Chance
There are quite a few instances of unreason arising from a misunderstanding of chance.
Sometimes this is because chance phenomena can often be curiously counter-intuitive, but
often it is simply because people do not have a good understanding of probabilistic notions.
2.1. The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and Base Rate Ignorance
A series of recent papers, notably by John Ioannidis, have argued that ‘most current
published research ﬁndings are false’.5,6 The argument, and the reasoning behind it, is
not new, but it makes good headline material, which is why articles such as that in the
New Yorker7 caught on to it, and asked ‘is there something wrong with the scientiﬁc
method?’ The answer to that question is, of course, ‘no’. Ioannidis states (Ref. 5, p. 696)
‘There is increasing concern that in modern research, false ﬁndings may be the majority
or even the vast majority of published research claims’ and he gives three references
attesting to this ‘increasing concern’. Now, there may indeed be such increasing concern
but two of Ioannidis’s three references are to his own papers, while the third is to a 2003
paper, so on the basis of that his assertion of ‘increasing concern’ would appear to
be stretching things. I am reminded of Bjørn Lomborg’s highly selective reporting of
evidence in his book The Skeptical Environmentalist.8
The phenomenon Ioannidis has spotted is one of a number of biases with which
statisticians are familiar, and which they take steps to ameliorate.
One of these is what is called the Prosecutor’s Fallacy, or the error of the transposed
conditional. This is the mistake of confusing the probability that the observed data would
have arisen, given that a particular scientiﬁc hypothesis is true, with the probability that
the scientiﬁc hypothesis is true, given the observed data has arisen. Now it is easy to get
from one of these conditional probabilities to the other, via Bayes theorem (whether you
are a Bayesian or not). But when you do this, not surprisingly, you need to take into
account how many true and false null hypotheses there are. If I test thousands of drugs,
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the vast majority of which really have no effect and just a handful of which have an
effect, then amongst those I ﬂag as apparently effective most will be useless. They
will be scientiﬁc ‘discoveries’ which are in fact chance events, not of any real interest.
This implies, in particular, that we should expect them to vanish on replication.
Ioannidis goes on to point out that smaller studies are less powerful (so there is less
opportunity for false hypotheses to be rejected), that the same is true if the effect sizes are
small (both of these points are obvious and well-known), and also that there are a number
of conditions likely to lead to preferential selection of spuriously signiﬁcant effects.
These are discussed below.
2.2. Regression to the Mean
If I throw 3600 standard cubic dice, I might expect about 600 of them to show a 6. Let’s
focus our attention on those c.600. One-hundred percent showed a 6. Now what is likely
to happen if I throw those 600 again? I’d expect about 100 of them, that is about 17% to
show a 6. Does this mean that the characteristics of those 600 have changed: that
previously they had a propensity to come up 6, and that this propensity has now
vanished. Does it mean that ‘cosmic habituation’ has occurred? This, along with the term
‘decline effect’, is a term invented by Jonathan Schooler,9 partly in jest, to describe the
fact that it looked as if ‘the cosmos was habituating to [his] ideas’7 in that previous
‘discoveries’ he had made no longer seemed to be replicable. It occurs to me that
Schooler is not the ﬁrst to suggest hypotheses like this – I am reminded of Rupert
Sheldrake’s morphic resonance, which hit the headlines a few years ago.10 And I note
with some satisfaction, that morphic resonance seems itself to have been subject to the
decline effect, as it appears to have vanished from the popular press.
In fact, of course, what has happened to my dice is an extreme example of regression
to the mean. My selection process has chosen those that, by chance, produced values
much higher than the mean. When I throw them again, they are equally likely, by chance,
to produce high or low values. The apparent effect vanishes.
This phenomenon is ubiquitous. It explains why ﬁlm sequels rarely do as well as the
original, why sportsmen often deteriorate after an outstanding performance, and why an
exceptional value observed in a scientiﬁc experiment may not be replicated when the
experiment is repeated. But the important thing about it is that it is not causal in any
sense. There is no mechanism relating the value of the ﬁrst observation to the value of the
second. It is simply that both are independently drawn from the same distribution.
2.3. Selection Bias
In my example of 3600 dice there was in fact nothing unusual about the c.600 dice that
initially showed a 6. But in other situations there may be something distinctive about
those chosen for inclusion in a study, and this distinctive aspect may be related to the
aims of the study, to the extent that the conclusions are misleading. This phenomenon,
generically called selection or selectivity bias is, like regression to the mean, ubiquitous.
And it occurs in many guises. In science in particular, it occurs in the form of publication
bias: the tendency to preferentially publish papers that appear to demonstrate an effect.
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It is not a newly discovered phenomenon, so I think a lack of understanding of it
qualiﬁes as ‘unreason’. Francis Bacon, writing in 1605, described the response of
Diagoras, who, on having his attention drawn to a picture of sailors who had prayed
and had survived shipwreck, asked ‘but where are they painted that were drowned’ after
their vows?11
2.4. Coincidences
One popular source of unreason arising from chance is that of the coincidence. Coincidences
are concurrences of events apparently so improbable that one suspects a hidden causal
agency. Examples of such agencies are personal gods, superstitions, magic, and Jung’s
synchronicity. In fact, however, coincidences have natural laws, paralleling familiar statistical
laws, such as the central limit theorem and the law of large numbers.12 These laws include:
(1) The law of total probability: one of an exhaustive set of possible events
must happen.
(2) The law of truly large numbers: with a large enough random data set, any
speciﬁed data conﬁguration is likely to occur.
(3) The law of near enough: events that are sufﬁciently similar are regarded as
identical.
(4) The law of search: if it’s not one of those, how about one of these?
(5) The law of the lever: a slight adjustment to a distribution can dramatically
alter probabilities.
(6) The law of the tortoise: all journeys take place one step at a time.
(7) The law of selection: paint the target round the arrow.
3. Conclusion
Let me return to the New Yorker article.7 This suggests that the universe may be changing
about us: ‘But now all sorts of well-established, multiply conﬁrmed ﬁndings have started
to look increasingly uncertain. It’s as if our facts were losing their truth’. It goes on to
note that ‘If replication is what separates the rigor of science from the squishiness of
pseudoscience, where do we put all these rigorously validated ﬁndings that can no longer
be proved?’ But that’s the whole point of replication. What is being described here is the
very fact that the attempt to replicate is failing, so suggesting that the initial ‘discoveries’
were not actually truths at all. That is the very essence of science.
I particularly liked the line in the article saying ‘it appears that nature often gives us
different answers.’ Indeed it does. This is known as random variability. It arises from the
fact that circumstances and people differ, and that they respond differently at different
times and under different conditions. That life and the universe simply are not deter-
ministic. That’s why we need statistics to tease out the answers.
To give Lehrer credit, the article does refer to regression to the mean, publication
bias, selective reporting in the ﬁrst place, small sample sizes aggravating selection bias,
perception biases in measurement, and data dredging. But we also need to consider the
relative balance between the number of facts that ‘look as if they are losing their truth’
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and the number of facts that still look as if they are true. Those that appear to be ‘losing
their truth’ are the ones that attract attention. We don’t get up in the morning and shout
‘hey, guys, aspirin still works!’
I think the tone of Lehrer’s article demonstrates the failure of education to
convey the nature of the scientiﬁc process. Either that or it is a journalist’s attempt to
whip up a story. Perhaps it merits a sequel. The headline could be ‘Has reporter got it
wrong?’, and the content could contain sentences such as: ‘if things are uncertain
you don’t know for sure what will happen’ and ‘a coin that comes up heads on one
toss and tails on the next hasn’t necessarily been switched from a two headed to a two-
tailed coin’.
I want to conclude by quoting two passages.
The ﬁrst is from the eminent biologist E.O. Wilson:
Today the greatest divide within humanity is not between races, or religions, or even, as
widely believed, between the literate and illiterate. It is the chasm that separates scientiﬁc
from prescientiﬁc cultures. Without the instruments and accumulated knowledge of the
natural sciences – physics, chemistry, and biology – humans are trapped in a cognitive
prison. They are like intelligent ﬁsh born in a deep, shadowed pool. Wondering and
restless, longing to reach out, they think about the world outside. They invent ingenious
speculations and myths about the origin of the conﬁning waters, of the sun and the sky
and the stars above, and the meaning of their own existence. But they are wrong, always
wrong, because the world is too remote from ordinary experience to be merely imagined.
(Ref. 13, p. 48)
For the second, I want to turn to a physicist: James Clerk Maxwell. He was one of the
world’s greatest physicists, ranking alongside Newton and Einstein. What not everyone may
know, however, is that he also wrote poetry. One of his poems had the title Notes of the
President’s Address, and was related to his presidency of the British Association in 1874.
A passage from it seems particularly relevant to this conference. It says (Ref. 14, p. 639):
In the very beginnings of science, the parsons, who managed things then,
Being handy with hammer and chisel, made gods in the likeness of men;
Till Commerce arose, and at length some men of exceptional power
Supplanted both demons and gods by the atoms, which last to this hour.
Yet they did not abolish the gods, but they sent them well out of the way,
With the rarest of nectar to drink, and blue ﬁelds of nothing to sway.
From nothing comes nothing, they told us, nought happens by chance but by fate;
There is nothing but atoms and void, all else is mere whims out of date!
Then why should a man curry favour with beings who cannot exist,
To compass some petty promotion in nebulous kingdoms of mist?
But not by the rays of the sun, nor the glittering shafts of the day,
Must the gods be dispelled, but by words, and their wonderful play.
I have taken the liberty of interpreting the last lines as saying that our hopes that the dark
mists of unreason can be dispersed by logic and rationality, are unrealistic. Instead, we
will have to resort to emotional persuasion. We must take on board the recent discoveries
by the behavioural economists I mentioned earlier, and acknowledge the fact that we are
irrational human beings. Regrettable though it may be, we must tackle irrationality using
our rationally acquired understanding of how irrational people behave.
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